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Abstract. This paper generates a typology of balance-of-payments crises under rational expectations,  namely liquidity crises
and solvency crises.  The ex-post application of official financial rescue packages of sufficient size is a perfect cure for
liquidity crises but amounts to an ineffective and costly bailout of private investors in the case of solvency crises.  The
anticipation of the rescue program encourages borrowing offsetting any solvency improvement. Due to likely imperfections
in implementation, actual rescue programs entail official financial losses and may be easily counterproductive due to moral
hazard.  In particular, if liquidity and solvency crises cannot be distinguished, rescue programs heighten the risk of crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
The financial difficulties experienced in Mexico in 1994, characterized by abrupt Central Bank reserve losses and
the unwillingness of investors to roll over public bonds despite good fiscal indicators, have provoked a reexamination of
balance-of-payments crises.  The unprecedented and ad-hoc gigantic rescue package put together by the international
community (especially the United States Treasury, IMF and BIS) at the beginning of 1995 has spurred intense controversy,
as well as deep concern on the part of those who see this kind of emergency as a natural feature of emerging markets.  It has
been agreed among G-10 countries that a new emergency financing mechanism, based on the IMF=s General Agreement to
Borrow, will be established to halt similar crises in the future.  This paper analyzes the root causes that may give rise to
external capital market crises of the kind observed in Mexico, as well as the efficacy of official financing packages in
preventing or overcoming such crises.
Most of the debate concerning the Mexican crisis focused on exchange rate policy: whether the Mexican peso
should have been devalued before the crisis and, if so, when and by how much.  Such a policy focus is based on the implicit2
assumption that the crisis would have been avoided had Mexico followed a different exchange rate policy, certainly the one
that, in hindsight, appears to be the best.  We make the observation that the elimination of the real exchange rate
disequilibrium through deep devaluation and free floating following the crisis did nothing to calm foreign investors or to
diminish the need for a massive rescue package in order to avoid default, which casts doubts on the validity of this exchange
rate-based interpretation of the crisis.  We argue that an alternative way to interpret the evidence is to focus on the underlying
factors adversely affecting foreign investors' perception of risks and returns in all financial instruments, whether or not they
were subject to devaluation risk, over the course of 1994.
1  Under this interpretation, the pressure on the Mexican peso due
to capital outflows and the financial crisis that made the rescue package necessary are both consequences of the underlying
shift in investors' perceptions.  A devaluation would relieve the first disequilibrium without necessarily affecting the second
one.
Consequently, this paper focuses on the risk that a country might fail to honor its external obligations, which is the
contingency whose anticipation triggers the rationing of foreign capital and is the natural premise for a balance-of-payments
rescue package such as the one provided to Mexico.  The focus on payments crises, as opposed to currency crises, deviates
                                               
1  This is in contrast with a recent paper by Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), who interpret the crises in Mexico
and other emerging markets with a model whose key feature is devaluation risk.  Devaluation risk is certainly more important
in the recent capital inflows episode than it was in the 1970s, a point that was stressed before the crisis by Dooley,
Fernandez-Arias, and Kletzer (1995) to show the vulnerability of emerging markets, but it does not fully explain why
Mexico could not roll over dollar-linked Tesobonos after the peso was let to float.  We conjecture that the static model in
Sachs et al. would produce a reversion of capital outflows after the devaluation takes place if a second period is considered.3
from the traditional balance-of-payments crisis literature that began with the seminal paper by Krugman (1979).  That
literature has been concerned mainly with exchange rate crises (i.e., the collapse of a nonflexible exchange rate) and with
 the sudden loss of international reserves that precedes
them.
2  The next section elaborates on the importance of focusing on the payment crisis aspect of balance-of-payments crises
in developing countries.  While this paper was written with the
Mexican crisis in mind, the modeling approach is quite general and its implications apply to all payment crises regardless
of their causes. 
In this paper, by definition, an external financial crisis occurs when a country does not honor a significant portion
of its international financial contracts (e.g., the redemption of Mexican Tesobonos).  The crisis emerges when the burden
of external obligations is too large relative to the cost of default, in which case the country chooses not to pay.
3  Despite this
element of "willingness to pay,@ however, it has been customary in the recent sovereign debt literature to recast this sovereign
choice in terms of the traditional corporate bankruptcy model by defining the cost of default as the country's "capacity to pay."
                                               
2  An important exception is Calvo (1995), who develops separate models to illuminate various aspects of capital
market crises without necessarily linking them to collapsing exchange rates.  That piece inspired the generic analysis of the
mechanics of balance-of-payments crises developed in this paper.  Recent work by Atkeson and Rios-Rull (1995), which
came to our attention after this paper was prepared, also focuses on payment crises.
3Costly default is required to sustain investment, although the nature and size of the costs of default are unclear
because, unlike the corporate case, international collateral pledges are difficult to enforce.  See Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz
(1986) for an analysis of the costs of default.  If the costs of default do not accrue to investors, e.g., through seizures, then
the effective costs of default would result from bargaining between creditor and debtor, as discussed in Bulow and Rogoff
(1989).4
 Following this convention, external financial crises are due to the country's "insolvency," or at least to a generalized
perception of Ainsolvency@ that precludes new borrowing and leads to default.
That financial crises are due to widespread perceived insolvency is completely in line with Krugman's (1989)
seminal insight that "there is no such a thing as a pure liquidity problem; it must arise because of doubts about solvency."
 Otherwise some loans would be available and the Aliquidity problem@ would cease to exist.  Nevertheless, the Mexican
balance-of-payments rescue package and the increased funding of the IMF so that it will be able to finance similar packages
in the future are predicated on the belief that such packages are needed to provide the liquidity a country requires to dig itself
out of a crisis.  This strategy presumes that the country is solvent enough as to be able to repay all investors, including official
rescuers, at the end of the rescue process.  The contrast between the "liquidity" and "solvency" diagnosis is not new in the
analysis of balance-of-payments crises.  For example, it is very reminiscent of the debate between the Brady and the Baker
strategies for solving the debt crisis of the 1980s, the first strategy calling for debt reduction in order to eliminate insolvency
and the second strategy calling for debt increase in order to provide the liquidity needed for growth and the resolution of the
crisis.
The first question that arises, then, is whether these two views of crises, solvency and liquidity, can be reconciled
without simply assuming that the market is wrong in its doubts about solvency.  In this paper we investigate this question
by focusing on the effect that liquidity may have on solvency, following Calvo (1995).  For example, lack of liquidity
available to the public sector may require increased  taxation or public prices, with the effect of reducing private and
aggregate investment and, hence, solvency.  Alternatively, lack of liquidity may lead to a reduction in public investment,
whose aggregate effect on investment and growth may be drastically magnified by inefficiencies in the reduction program,
such as the interruption of maintenance, and the negative effect on complementary private investment, as in fact happened
in countries during the debt crisis of the 1980s.  Lack of foreign exchange liquidity may also have  a dramatic negative effect
on aggregate investment and solvency if the tradeable sector is price inelastic and  investment is import intensive, as
observed in many countries during the imports contraction caused by the debt crisis.
The recognition of how liquidity affects solvency leads to a generalization of Krugman=s  (1989)  insight and
enables us to meaningfully define liquidity and solvency crises, as well as the related concepts of panic and fundamentals-
based crises, in the context of a unified framework.  We do find circumstances under which crises can be appropriately
termed liquidity crises and rescue packages make perfect sense, which bear some similarity to the seminal analysis by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) on bank runs and the role of deposit insurance.  However, liquidity crises are possible only
if the liquidity effects on solvency are sufficiently strong, as measured by a simple marginal net solvency condition.  These5
liquidity crises correspond to multiple equilibrium situations, which in the context of this paper can be interpreted as sunspot
equilibria of the kind recently characterized by Cole and Kehoe (1995).
4  The additional analytical structure in this paper
enables us to explicitly identify these outcomes in order to evaluate the performance of rescue packages.
                                               
4The paper by Cole and Kehoe came to our attention after this paper was prepared.  We conjecture that the set of
sunspot equilibria they identify in their model is empty unless a condition similar to the one we present in this paper for the
existence of liquidity crises holds.  This is important because without sunspot equilibria rescue packages do not work. 
This general analysis of types of balance-of-payments crises is the foundation for our assessment of a balance-of-
payments rescue program of the kind that is being envisaged after the Mexican crisis, the main ingredients of which can be
summarized as follows.  The relevance of liquidity crises as defined in our typology of balance-of-payments crises, which
is key to justifying the application of financial rescue packages, requires strong liquidity effects on solvency, low
Afundamental@ solvency, and investors who are prone to  Apanic.@  Even if these conditions are met, the success of a balance-
of-payments rescue program crucially depends on the degree of accuracy with which solvency and liquidity crises can be
distinguished from each other when rescue packages are implemented, because in solvency crises, official rescue packages
amount to ineffective costly bailouts of private investors.  In contrast to the unanticipated emergency rescue package for
Mexico, future packages of the type currently being envisaged will be anticipated by the market, which implies that their
bailout component will be an implicit unpaid guarantee to foreign investors.  This guarantee is a source of moral hazard that
induces risky borrowing and turn the rescue program counterproductive..
   The paper is structured as follows.  Section 1 elaborates on the relevance and scope of the definition of external
financial crisis used in this paper.   Section 2 captures the essential elements of the problem in a simple model that formally
defines concepts frequently used in policy discussions on the subject, and Section 3 analyzes the ex-post economic impact
(i.e.,  the cost and effectiveness of resolving crises) of an emergency financing mechanism.
Sections 4 and 5 look at the ex-ante problem by building a formal model where foreign investors and country
authorities rationally anticipate the availability of international rescue packages.  Section 4 is the benchmark market case,
with no official intervention, and Section 5 examines the effect of rescue packages (i.e., their cost and effectiveness in
preventing crises) in a variety of scenarios.  Section 6 summarizes the findings and concludes.
1.  BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS CRISES
Our definition of external financial crisis centers on the political risk of the country=s international obligations not
being honored when they exceed the country=s capacity to pay.  Since in international financial contracts massive default
generally involves a purposeful government decision, as opposed to technical insolvency or actual inability to pay, we 
restrict our  attention to politically based default.  The anticipation of this failure to effect the payment of contractual
obligations leads to capital rationing.6
The definition is purposely agnostic about the underlying shock or disequilibrium prompting the external financial
crisis in order to facilitate analysis of  the common features of such crises and their remedies.  This is important because the
relevance of different types of shocks in crises is varied, or at least usually controversial.  For example, as shown in
Fernandez-Arias (1996), international interest rates are important for the debt-carrying capacity of debtor countries, i.e., for
their credit ceilings and creditworthiness, and may provoke a regime switch between access to capital markets and rationing.
 Consequently, one leading cause of crisis in developing countries is the increase in international interest rates, which  has
been identified as a key factor leading to the debt crisis at the beginning of the 1980s and has also played an important role
in the deterioration of Mexico=s capital account after February 1994.  However, domestic factors have also deteriorated in
the case Mexico and contributed to its recent crisis, although their extent and nature in terms of fundamentals is controversial.
 The definitions and models in this paper do not assume any particular underlying shock, and therefore their implications
have general validity.
They are also flexible enough to accommodate a variety of factors underlying government unwillingness to honor
the country=s financial obligations.  For example,  public sector Acapacity to pay@  depends on a combination of balance-of-
payments factors (the external transfer problem) and fiscal factors (the internal transfer problem) that are relevant for both
the burden of complying and the cost of default, as analyzed by, among others, Fernández-Arias (1991) and Montiel (1993),
and empirically estimated by Bevilaqua (1995).  Rigidities in the domestic financial system may also prompt government
intervention in private markets which can also result in an external financial crisis.
This definition of  financial crisis is broad.  It includes the debt crisis of the 1980s,  in which there was a
generalized failure in a number of countries to honor public sector external debt obligations as well as in the private sector
as a result of deliberate government interference, as opposed to commercial reasons, where substantial external private debt
obligations were nationalized or controlled by the public sector.  It also includes the current episode of private capital inflows
attracted by the private sector, rather than by public sector borrowing, as in most cases leading to the 1980s debt crisis.
5
                                               
5  Chile is an important exception to this public-private pattern.  Chile fell into the debt crisis not because of high
external public debt but through the nationalization of high external private debt, in what may be a preview of crises to come7
 Under this definition, external financial crises may originate in current account deficits of the private sector rather than in
fiscal imbalances,  either current or post-crisis.  Such situations may come about as a result of either public or private foreign
liabilities, since they impose a similar strain on the balance of payments (e.g., private sector capital outflows in Mexico
during 1994 set the stage for the difficulties of redeeming public bonds once international reserves had been depleted).
6 
                                                                                                                                                      
now that Chile=s pattern is  more common.
6  Furthermore, the Mexican crisis was not confined to the public domain.  Lustig (1996) reports that Mexican
banks were also unable to renew certificates of deposit.8
 Loss of  reserves and exchange rate crises are neither necessary nor sufficient for external financial crisis.  First
and foremost, exchange rate crises need not be accompanied by external financial crises.  In the context of this paper, a
financial  crisis is caused by the adverse evolution of the underlying determinants of capital inflows and country risk, which
creates the conditions for capital outflows and for the country not to honor international obligations.  If capital outflows result
from an unsustainable fixed exchange rate that is expected to be devalued, an exchange rate crisis leading to a float would
eliminate the disequilibrium and, therefore, should not lead to a financial  crisis of the kind analyzed in this paper.
7 
Conversely, currency crises are not necessary for payment crises: flexible exchange rate regimes may precede default. 
Furthermore, many countries ran arrears during the 1980s while accumulating substantial reserves.  While a large fall in
international reserves usually occurs before default materializes, it sometimes does not, depending on economic
circumstances and strategic considerations.  Therefore, in this paper the factors determining capital flows and country default
risk are essential, while international reserves and the exchange rate are peripheral.
2.  SOLVENCY AND LIQUIDITY CRISES
                                               
7  Presumably, this would have also been the case in Mexico after the currency was allowed to float in December
1994, had there not been other problems.  The case can be made that the remaining problems, as well as the loss of reserves
suffered throughout 1994, had to do with fundamental doubts about Mexico=s future capacity to pay.  If so, then the analyses
of the Mexican crisis that emphasize exchange rate policy as well as  the timing and size of the devaluation may be
misleading.9
In this section, solvency and liquidity crises are defined and characterized in the context of a model where all agents
possess the same information and are fully rational, including rational expectations.  For simplicity, the model in this section
features an economy where all liabilities take the form of debt denominated in foreign currency.
8  This assumption leaves
                                               
8  This simplification is justified not only because of the relative importance of this class of financial instruments in
actual portfolios, but also because most classes of foreign investment are likely to be affected by an external financial crisis
(see Fernández-Arias,  1996, technical appendix).10
out devaluation risk and enables us to focus on default risk, which is the key ingredient of payments crises.
9
A Simple Model
 The dynamic elements of the problem can be captured in a simple two-period model.  Foreign liabilities take the
form of bonds D maturing at the end of period 1 and carrying a debt service obligation C (encompassing both principal and
interest).  In this section we take both contractual variables D and C as given parameters.
10  At the end of period 1, new
bonds N maturing at the end of period 2 are issued, including maturing bonds that are rolled over (not redeemed) either
voluntarily or through arrears.  Therefore, the net flow of resources received by the country in period 1 is F=N-C.
                                               
9   This case is complementary to the case analyzed by Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996), where the opposite
assumption is made, i.e., foreign debt is in the form of bonds denominated in domestic currency, in order to focus on
currency crises.
10  The endogenous determination of volume and terms of external finance will be addressed in the ex-ante analysis
in sections 4 and 5.
As it is customary in sovereign debt models, we assume that there is a maximum net amount that a country would
pay toward its foreign liabilities in any given period, which relates to some measure of  Acapacity to pay.@  We denote by x1
and x2 the maximum resources available for the net debt service in periods 1 and 2,  respectively.  The country=s solvency
is defined as the expected present value of this stream of  resources, discounted at the investor=s alternative rate of return.
 This sovereign case differs from  the corporate case in that assets cannot be legally seized, and as a result the debtors= wealth
 and the country=s wealth far exceed  this measure of solvency. This customary economic definition of country solvency is
appropriate for this purpose.11
To simplify, we assume that as of the end of period 1 there is no uncertainty about period 2, so that capacity to pay
x2 is known with certainty.  (The relaxation of this assumption would introduce algebraic complications without adding new
insights.)  To simplify notation, but without loss of generality, second-period capacity to pay  x2 is expressed in present value
form, discounted at the risk-free rate, and is therefore the credit ceiling in period 1.  New lending N,  not exceeding that
ceiling (N< x2), is voluntarily lent, and assuming competitive lending, the riskless rate is charged.  Alternatively (if N>x2),
partial default results and lending is involuntary.
Based on the previous analysis and following Calvo (1995), in this model liquidity matters for solvency.  The lower
the net flow of resources received by the country in period 1, that is, the higher the net redemptions paid out in period 1, the
lower the level of repayment resources available in period 2.  A financial crunch in period 1 leads to lower investment and
capacity to pay, which may be extremely damaging if unit adjustment costs increase with the severity of the crunch. 
Specifically, the repayment capacity in period 2, x2, is linked to the net flow of resources made available in period 1, F, such
that x 2 =  x 2 [F], x2= > 0, x2" < 0.
Definition: A crisis occurs when legally binding contracts are not honored.    In this two-period formulation, four types
of outcomes can be characterized based on this definition:
Outcome Period 1 Period 2
(No crisis) No crisis No crisis
(Crisis Type I) Crisis Crisis
(Crisis Type II) No Crisis Crisis
(Crisis Type III) Crisis No crisis
Characterization of Market Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the market equilibrium resulting from the interaction of competitive bondholders,
without the interference of international financial institutions, and characterize the equilibrium outcomes and types of crises
that emerge.
By definition, a crisis occurs in period 2 when contractual debt service associated with the outstanding bonds N
is not fully serviced.  Under the certainty assumption of this model, this occurs when N>x2[N-C].  In this case, lending in
period 1 is involuntary (profits over the second period are negative), and therefore the repayment is constrained at its
maximum feasible level.  In principle, repayments in period 1 may be constrained by either the country=s capacity to pay x1
(Type I crisis) or the level of debt obligations coming due C; that is, the creditors=contractual legal claims  (Type II crisis).
A Type I crisis obtains when obligations exceed capacity to pay (C > x1).  In this case, net flows and second-period
capacity to pay are minimized: F = -x1 and x2 =x2 [-x1].  In that case, there is involuntary lending (N=C-x1>0) and the second-
period crisis condition takes the form C-x1>x2[-x1].  Therefore, if C >x1, in this model a crisis in the second period is a
sufficient condition for crisis in the first period.  A Type II crisis, however, can be ruled out in this model because it is
inconsistent with second-period crisis, since all debt is repaid (N=0).
Conversely, a crisis occurs in period 1 when the net debt service obligations that creditors demand exceed
maximum capacity to pay, in which case actual lending N reaches its minimum level N=C-x1 (necessarily positive in this
case).  The previous condition for second-period crisis evaluated at this critical point (C-x1>x2[-x1]) is now a necessary
condition for crisis in period 1: If outstanding debt does not exceed capacity to pay, then competitive lending yields zero
profits over the second period and there is no reason for bondholders to insist upon redeeming bonds beyond the country=s
capacity to pay (or for new lenders not to voluntarily replace excess redemptions).  Therefore, in this model crisis in the
second period is a necessary condition for crisis in the first period.
This discussion rules out the possibility of Type II and Type III crises as a market equilibrium outcome.
11   Only
two outcomes are possible in market equilibrium: I) there is no crisis at all (ANo Crisis@); or ii) there is a crisis in both
                                               
11  In a model with second-period debt, Type II crises are possible.  In a model with uncertainty in the second
period, the necessary condition C1+C2-x1>E[x2] is not equivalent to crisis in the second period (since it only refers to
expected values), and therefore, Type III crises are possible (i.e., the country may be sufficiently lucky in the second period
and the crisis may resolve).12
periods (ACrisis Type I@).  The most interesting case for the issue at hand--rescue packages to resolve crises--is the one where
a crisis in period 1 is possible; that is, C >x1.  In this case, crisis in period 2 is a necessary and sufficient condition for crisis
in period 1.
These  types of equilibrium outcomes can be characterized as follows:
No Crisis:  F > -x1 and F+C < x2[F]
(The above inequalities determine a supply range in terms of the amount of new lending N=F+C.  The actual equilibrium
depends on demand, to be modeled in subsequent sections.)
Crisis: F = -x1 and F+C < x2[F]
What Is a Liquidity Crisis?
Crisis (of Type I) obtains when maximum enforceable payments x1 are made in period 1 and the resulting second-
period contractual obligations exceed capacity to pay.  This is the case when C > x1 + x 2 [-x 1].   The implication is that if
 C <  x 1 + x  2 [-x 1 ],  then crisis does not occur.  The interpretation of this standard condition is that crises occur when
outstanding obligations exceed solvency.
However, this model differs from the standard model in that solvency is not predetermined but depends on liquidity.
 In this model, the non crisis condition C < x1 + x2[-x1] is sufficient but may fail to be necessary for crisis avoidance: The
non crisis outcome can be attained for C < x2 [F] - F, with F > -x1 , of which the previous sufficient condition corresponds
to the particular case F=-x1.  Increased liquidity F > -x1 may avoid the crisis.
This generalized non crisis condition can be interpreted as debt obligations not exceeding solvency under a feasible
financial arrangement.  If additional new financing is allowed (subject to the constraints that second-period solvency is not
violated), then the set of debt obligations C consistent with non crisis outcomes could expand, in which case it would overlap
with the set defined by the crisis condition already identified.  This area of intersection corresponds to market crises that can
be avoided by appropriate debt service rescheduling, in contrast to unavoidable crises for which rescheduling is no cure.
Ultimately, ex-post, all crises among rational agents are due to expected insolvency.  However, in order to explore
the nature of crises, it is necessary to go beyond the previous typology of how crises manifest and analyze the underlying
conditions that give rise to them.  The previous concept of crisis avoidability provides a basis for such analysis:
Definition: A liquidity crisis is a crisis that can be avoided through the provision of liquidity at market terms
(appropriate rescheduling in the context of this model).
Definition: A solvency crisis is a crisis that cannot be avoided through the provision of liquidity at market terms.
Based on these definitions, we consider the liquidity provision that supports maximum debt obligations:
(1)
Under the assumption that
second-period capacity to pay
is increasing and concave in liquidity,
 Fmax > -x1  if and only if x2=  [-x1] > 1.  In other words, optimal liquidity  deviates from the crisis outcome - x1  if and only
if the marginal solvency impact of additional liquidity under crisis conditions is large enough to increase the resources
available for payment net of the new lending; that is, for payment of the rest of the debt.  Otherwise, Fmax =  -x1  and there
is no liquidity infusion on market terms that could avoid the crisis.
Therefore, there is a (non empty) set of liquidity crises if and only the liquidity effect on solvency is strong enough:
The fact that liquidity
matters for solvency is not
enough to produce liquidity
crises.  This is analogous to the perverse effect of debt overhang studied in the sovereign debt literature.  In that case, the
fact that the debt stock matters for solvency is not enough to produce a Laffer curve and justify unilateral debt forgiveness.
If liquidity effects are strong enough, then there is an overlapping interval between the crisis and the non crisis
regions that corresponds by definition to liquidity crises:
x - >   F   to     subject F), - [F] x (   argmax   = F 1 2 max
1 > ] x [- x 1 2¢
] F [ x + F - < C < ] x [- x + x 2 1 2 1 max max13
(1)
Consequently, the three relevant intervals determining the likelihood of crises are: I) the solvency interval,  where
no crisis can occur; ii) the illiquidity interval, where a (liquidity) crisis may or may not occur depending on available
liquidity; and iii) the insolvency interval, where a (solvency) crisis necessarily occurs.  In terms of the model, they are:
Solvency: C < x1 + x2[-x1]
Illiquidity:  x1 + x2 [-x1] < C <  - Fmax + x2 [Fmax]
Insolvency: C > -Fmax + x2[Fmax]
  Notice that it remains true that any crisis, even if of liquidity, signals weak solvency.  The illiquidity interval lies
between the solvency and insolvency intervals, which implies that a liquidity crisis cannot occur if solvency is strong.
In the illiquidity interval there are two market equilibria: one where a crisis results, and another one where the crisis
is avoided.  By definition, liquidity crises require the existence of multiple equilibria.  It is important to note that within the
illiquidity interval,  the provision of the liquidity required to avoid the crisis is an equilibrium fully consistent with individual
investors=profit maximization; i.e., no participating investor has an incentive to withdraw and Afree ride@on the rest. 
Therefore, which equilibrium is realized is purely a matter of coordination.  Precisely because the failure of such a happy
equilibrium requires the shared expectation of a massive defection, it is natural to define the so-called panic crises as liquidity
crises.
12
It is interesting to note that when liquidity effects are strong and condition (2) is met, it is always in the creditors=
collective interest to provide adequate liquidity when facing a crisis.  If solvency is not too weak, such action prevents a
liquidity crisis, as noted above.  If solvency is weaker, the (solvency) crisis is unavoidable but, nevertheless, losses can be
minimized by providing liquidity Fmax, which entails a defensive lending of   Fmax + x1 > 0.  But the analogy between liquidity
and solvency crises stops there.  In the case of a solvency crisis, such provision of liquidity is not an equilibrium, and
therefore participating investors would have an incentive
to withdraw and free ride on the liquidity provided by the rest.  A non market enforcement mechanism, beyond pure
coordination, would be required in this case.
                                               
12  Whether or not a potential liquidity or panic crisis would materialize, i.e., which one of the two equilibria is
selected, is not addressed in this paper.  These panic crises correspond to the self-fulfilling crises in Cole and Kehoe (1995).
Some of the debates concerning debt crisis strategies can be interpreted along these lines.  For example, the Baker
strategy, where commercial banks were indicated the amount of resources they should provide in the aggregate on a voluntary
basis, could be suitable for a liquidity crisis as defined above.  Conversely, in a solvency crisis commercial banks would
cooperate with an efficient solution only if additional compensation or pressure is provided, as in the Brady strategy.  The
failure of the Baker strategy in bringing liquidity would indicate that the debt crisis was a solvency, rather than a  liquidity,
crisis, at least by the mid-1980s.
3.   THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL RESCUE PACKAGES14
We now analyze a situation where  a credit line is made available to the country by a third party in order to avoid
crisis in period 1, from which a loan L  (an international rescue package) is drawn.  We consider the optimistic case in which
the credit line is unlimited, and  leave out the case in which an otherwise successful rescue package may fail because of lack
of resources.  Consequently, since a crisis in the first period can always be avoided if this loan is sufficiently large (e.g.,
L=C), we  assume  this objective is achieved.  We also  assume for concreteness that this third party is an official senior
creditor (say IMF), but the conclusions also hold  if the third party has (de facto) equal seniority vis-á-vis private
bondholders.
Crises can now be private or official depending on whose claims are not honored.  Furthermore, this third party
intervention leads to the following changes in the model.  First, the net flow of  resources received by the country is
augmented by the official loan: F*= N-C+L.  Second, first-period capacity to pay to bondholders is increased by the official
loan to x1* = x 1 + L.
13    Third, second-period capacity to pay to bondholders is reduced by the senior official loan to x2*
= Max(0, x2[F*]-L).
14  Now the relevant private credit ceiling is  x2*, and private default occurs when N > x2*.
A rescue package that avoids a crisis in the first period (i.e., no contract is breached) implies that there is no
involuntary new private lending: either private bondholders have profitable investment opportunities available and
voluntarily lend (N > 0), or they do not have profitable opportunities and fully exit (N=0).  We analyze both cases in turn.
If there is positive lending, then it does not exceed second-period solvency available to private investors: 0 < N
< x2*.  Therefore, official lending does not absorb all of the country=s second-period solvency: x2* = x2 [N-C+L] -L>0.  This
ensures that official creditors will be repaid, and therefore no crisis, private or official, occurs in either period.  This non
crisis condition is:
                                               
13  The precise level of the first-period maximum enforceable payment to bondholders depends on how third party
intervention is structured (see Fernández-Arias, 1991 for a game-theoretic analysis).  The assumption in the text is an upper
bound that maximizes the package=s chance of success.
14  This reflects the customary Asingle pool@ assumption, in which creditors share a given overall country=s capacity
to pay x2.  In particular, it implicitly assumes no scope for conditionality associated with official lending, at least in terms of
expected repayment capacity.  This assumption appears largely justified in the context of an emergency rescue package, in
which a credible government=s commitment (e.g. through tranching) is difficult to establish.  
0 > N    and    L + x   >   N - C     with L - L] + C - [N x   < N 1 215
(4)
Substituting F=N-C+L and rearranging, it can be easily checked that equation (1) again determines the net flow
of resources that support maximum debt obligations, and therefore a crisis cannot be avoided unless C < - Fmax + x 2 [Fmax]
(the lower bound of the insolvency interval).  Within this interval, there is a range of feasible overall lending (N + L)>0, but
the private and official components are perfect substitutes and are not determined.  It can be easily checked that the converse
also holds: if indebtedness is outside the insolvency interval, then a rescue package can lead to voluntary private lending.
 In particular, a loan L = Fmax +C leads to strictly positive profits at N = 0 (0 < x2   [Fmax]-(Fmax+C)).
Therefore, adequately implemented international rescue packages solve liquidity crises.  They do so at no cost,
because the country retains enough solvency to pay them back in full.  In practice, once a liquidity crisis begins to manifest,
the use of a rescue package would restore confidence and allow the country to regain access to markets.  If adequately
engineered, private voluntary lending would perfectly substitute official lending and fully roll back the rescue loan.  Even
more, in theory, the availability of a sufficiently large line of credit should prevent liquidity crises from occurring at all: the
liquidity crisis outcome would cease to be an equilibrium as the expectation of a liquidity crunch becomes unjustified, and
the unique, fundamentals-based equilibrium would prevail.  The line of credit would be totally effective, cost free, and would
never need to be actually used!
However, rescue packages largely fail with solvency crises.  As noted above, in the insolvency interval private
voluntary lending is not maintained.  In that case, N = 0 and private solvency is null: 0 = N = x2 *.  This implies that the
rescue loan L absorbs all of the country=s second-period capacity to pay.  Since liquidity is F*=N-C+L=L-C, then L > x2 [L-
C].  Therefore, official creditors are not paid in full.  It is easy to check that the financial loss is minimized at Lmax =C+Fmax,
in which case the cost of the rescue package is (C+Fmax )-x2 [Fmax ] >0.
If liquidity effects are weak in the sense of equation, (2), that is x2= [-x1] < 1, the official loss is at least as large as
the implicit subsidy to private bondholders (it is identical if the official loss is minimized) and the country would benefit 
from the rescue package only if the official sector does not minimize its losses.  If liquidity effects are strong, then Fmax > -x1
 and optimal liquidity leads to an efficiency gain resulting from the alleviation of the liquidity crunch, which is shared
between the country and the official sector in the form of smaller losses (relative to the private gains).
But in all cases,  the Asuccessful@ application of international rescue packages in the case of solvency crises amounts
to a costly bailout of private bondholders.  The market solvency crisis is avoided at the cost of an official solvency crisis in
the second period.
This analysis suggests the rule of using international rescue packages in the case of liquidity crises but not in the
case of solvency crises.  Unfortunately, it appears difficult to distinguish between the two types of crises in a way that makes
this rule operational.  Consequently, if rescue packages are used, they can be expected to be used in insolvency situations
with some frequency, even if there is no intention of a costly bailout.  We make the observation that the fact that the Brady
strategy and its implicit shift to an insolvency diagnosis came only after several years of debt crisis points to a significant risk
of failing to recognize solvency crises in a timely fashion, specially in the emergency situations being analyzed. 
The expected cost of a rescue package is determined by the probability that it will be applied in a solvency crisis,
in which case it is a bailout.  This probability of misapplication depends positively on the risk of detection failure (i.e. the
probability that a solvency crisis is misdiagnosed as a liquidity crisis, q) and negatively on the relevance of liquidity crises
(i.e. the probability that a crisis is a liquidity crisis, l), according to the expression p=q(1-l)/(l+q(1-l)).  Ex-post, the
application of emergency rescue packages is worthwhile when the probability of missaplication p is low enough.  The
previous analysis suggests sizable detection errors (large q) and a narrow range supporting liquidity crises (small l), and
therefore a significant probability p that rescue packages are bailouts.
What can be said about the Mexican crisis and rescue package based on the previous analysis?  In theory, the very
application of a rescue package would reveal ex-post whether the  crisis was one of liquidity or solvency, depending on
whether or not the country regains access to private markets and the official loan is quickly repaid in full.  Shortly after the
Mexican currency adjustment, not even the announcement of an $18 billion rescue package, roughly equivalent to Mexico=s
 entire stock of short-term public bonds in the hands of foreigners, was enough to stop the run.  The payment crisis was
finally avoided by the pledging of an unprecedented  rescue package of almost $50 billion, roughly equivalent to all of
Mexico=s  external obligations for 1995,  about half of which were disbursed and remained outstanding (see Lustig, 1996,
for details).   On these grounds, the evidence indicates that the crisis was one of solvency and that, therefore, the rescue16
package was a costly bailout.
15  However, in 1996 Mexico has started repaying its US loan ahead of schedule replacing it
with bonds purchased by private investors.  True that this successful bond offering is far from full access to market as it
required the collateralization with Pemex oil revenues in what amounts to an erosion of the privileged status of senior
creditors, but it is an improvement in the private perception of Mexico=s solvency relative to the time of the crisis.
16  Whether
this development indicates that the initial perception of insolvency was unfounded or that events unfolded better than could
be initially expected is unclear.
                                               
15  The argument can be made that by the time the package was approved and put together the damage had already
been done.  But the Mexican package was put together in record time.  If the success of these packages is so dependent on
their quick approval and application, then this is one more reason to be concerned about the effectiveness of these programs.
16  Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the US loan repayments came under considerable pressures resulting
from the US political circumstances.  In contrast, as of August 1996, the IMF loan is not being repaid and the standby
agreement is being extended. 
4.  MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
The previous sections took the terms of the debt contracts (amount D and repayment terms C) as given parameters.
 However, the availability of rescue packages should reduce the ex-ante private perception of country risk.  This opens the
interesting possibility of optimal packages being effective policy instruments for dealing with solvency crises, despite being17
ineffective ex-post, by inducing less expensive repayment terms, thereby making insolvency less likely.  In any event, a full
analysis of the effect of international rescue packages requires taking into consideration that debt  contracts are often altered
in anticipation of the possible application of these packages.  This section builds a full model to analyze this ex-ante problem
and describes the market solution that emerges in the absence of rescue programs.  The next section introduces rescue
programs into the model.
The following simple model builds on the previous one and captures the essential elements of the ex-ante problem.
 (As before, all variables are expressed in present value terms.)  There are three periods: 0, 1, and 2 (which may be
considered the condensation of the infinite future).  As before, debt D is acquired in period 0 and due in period 1 in the
amount C.  In period 1 there is new lending which translates into a net flow of resources F.  Finally, in period 2 there are final
repayments.
Production in periods 0 and 1 is known and exogenous (and equal to one for simplicity).  External resources, both
the initial inflow D and the subsequent net inflow F, are invested and yield returns in period 2.  Production in period 2
increases with the initial long-term investment D and also with the subsequent liquidity F, required to obtain a high yield
from the original investment.  In summary, production at time 2 is s+g[D]+v[F], g[0]=v [0]=0, with both g[.] and v[.]
increasing and concave, where g(D) is the basic return of the investment and v(F) is the liquidity effect on production.
Apart from the use of external resources, production (and overall solvency) in period 2 is uncertain at time 0 when
the debt contracts are closed.  Specifically, at time 0, s is random and, as before, uncertainty is fully resolved at time 1 when
debt is due.  As customary in the sovereign debt literature, capacity to pay is endogenously modeled as a fraction ? of
production.  Therefore, capacity to pay is ? in period 1, which implies that F>-?.  Capacity to pay in period 2 is
?(s+g[D]+v[F]), where s is assumed to be at least -v[-?] to ensure that production is non-negative.  Therefore, the marginal
solvency effect of liquidity highlighted in this model equals ?v=[F].
It greatly simplifies the algebra to consider the increasing and concave liquidity function v[.] as: v[F]=cF, with c>0,
for F<0, and v[F]=0 for F>0.  Let k=?c be the liquidity effects as measured in condition (2).  Strong liquidity effects obtain
when k>1, which will be generally assumed to allow for an illiquidity interval and make the problem interesting.   As to
optimal
liquidity in equation (1), Fmax=0 (any positive net flow F is equivalent).  Then, the period -1 problem simplifies to F=-? if
there is crisis and to F=0 otherwise.
Consequently, the solvency, illiquidity, and insolvency intervals expressed in solvency space are:
Solvency: s > C[D]/? - (g[D]-(k-1))
Illiquidity: C[D]/? - (g[D]-(k-1)) < s < C[D]/? - g[D]
Insolvency: s < C[D]/? - g[D]
Default occurs in the insolvency interval (solvency crisis) and may also occur in the illiquidity region (liquidity
crisis).  For strong liquidity effects (k>1), we  assume that liquidity crisis is realized in  the relatively more insolvent states
of the illiquidity interval, when investors may be more prone to panic:
Liquidity Crisis: C[D]/? - (g[D]-p(k-1)) < s < C[D]/?- g[D]
Solvency Crisis: s < C[D]/? - g[D]
The parameter p represents  the proportion of the illiquid states that result in actual liquidity crisis, that is the
probability that the nonfundamental, sunspot equilibrium is selected when there are multiple equilibria.  If p = 1, all illiquid
states result in liquidity crises (investors always panic); if p=0, none does (investors never panic). The case of weak liquidity
effects (k < 1) can be obtained by setting p = 0, in which case the illiquidity interval vanishes and default occurs only in the
insolvency interval.
Therefore, default occurs when s<s[D], with the threshold state s[D] such that ?(s[D]+g[D]-p(k-1))=C[D]. 
P=P(s<s[D]) denotes the probability of default evaluated at time 0.  To simplify, it is assumed that s follows a uniform
distribution, so that p is the probability of a liquidity crisis given than an illiquid state is realized.   Consequently, the
probability that a crisis is of liquidity, l, equals p(k-1)/P. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the range of s is
[m,m+1].  Then for an interior s[D],  P=s[D]- m.
The country=s welfare function is assumed to be the expected present discounted value of income.  Since creditors
lend at a expected zero profit, this welfare function at time 0 collapses to W[D]=2+E[s]+g[D]+E[v[F]], where E is the
expectation operator.  Therefore, ex-ante welfare maximization amounts to maximizing g[D]+[v[F]];  that is, the efficiency
gains due to external borrowing, which under the assumptions equals g[D]+kP.  Therefore, for an interior solution where18
0<P<1, the objective function can be written as U[D]=g[D]-ks[D].
The sequence of decisions is as follows.  At time 0, debt D is acquired and carries a contractual debt service C[D]
due at time 1.  At time 1, s is realized.   If s<s[D], there is default: F=-? and overall repayments amount to ?(s+g[D]-(k-
1))<C[D].  If s>s[D], there is full compliance: overall repayments amount to the contractual amount C[D] and, without loss
of generality, F=0.  Lenders set the schedule C[D] such that these expected payments recover the initial investment D (zero
profit condition).  All agents have the same information and have rational expectations.
Note that in this model it is always efficient to increase external borrowing.  If liquidity were not a factor, initial
debt D would be equal to the credit ceiling.  (We  assume that the marginal effect of borrowing on capacity to pay is less than
unitary (?g=<1) to ensure that a credit ceiling exists and borrowing is finite.)
17    However, since the liquidity crunch that
would result from default is a factor, initial borrowing is moderated in order to leave room for additional liquidity in non
default states.  This tradeoff results in risky initial borrowing when incentives to borrow, as opposed to waiting, are
sufficiently high.  A sufficient condition for risky borrowing  is  ?g=>k/(1+k), which we assume in order to make the problem
interesting. 
The country concentrates its choice on initial borrowing D.  For an interior solution, it maximizes the objective
                                               
17    It is further assumed that k<2 to ensure the credit ceiling is risky.  It will be shown that the exact condition is:
k < (2 - p) / (1 - p) .   If the conditional probability of panic p is small, stronger liquidity effects make lenders unwilling to
lend in the face of any risk of default.19
function (4), where the threshold default state function s[D] (and the








                     
Differentiating (5) and (6), it is established that the default state function (s[D]) and the terms functions (C[D]) are
increasing and convex functions of debt D (see appendix).  For low levels of debt, no spread is charged (C[D]=D) and the
probability of default is zero (s[D]<m and P=0, consistent with (6).)   When borrowing is risky (P>0), positive and increasing
spreads C[D]-D are charged until the credit ceiling is reached at P=1-(1-p)(k-1).   Notice that credit rationing does not
necessarily signal default unless the illiquid region always leads to investor panic and default. 
18  
The convexity of these functions implies that the objective function U[D] is concave and that as long as there is
a liquidity effect (k<0),  optimal borrowing D* is determined by the first-order condition:
                                               
18  If liquidity effects are weak (k < 1), it is easy to check that the credit ceiling obtains at P = 1 (certain  default).
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It is shown in the appendix that the optimal borrowing condition (8) entails risky borrowing short of the credit
ceiling  (0<P*<1- (1 - p) (k -1).)  To make the problem interesting for the next section, we will assume that this optimal
choice of P* entails some risk of solvency crisis; that is, P*>p(k-1).  Therefore, the probability of a liquidity crisis is p(k-1)
and the probability of a solvency crisis is P*-p(k-1).
5.   EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL RESCUE PROGRAMS
By definition, a perfect rescue package is one  applied in the event of a liquidity crisis, in which case it is cost free
and totally effective, and not applied in the case of a solvency crisis, in which case it is costly and ineffective for  avoiding
a crisis.  A perfect package does more than perfectly prevent liquidity crises: since it improves country risk ex-ante, it also
leads to lower risk premia.  Through this channel, even though a perfect package is not applied to insolvency situations ex-
post, it has an indirect effect on reducing the risk of solvency crises by making repayment terms more affordable.  However,
before concluding that (perfect) packages would be, after all, effective policy for dealing with the problem of solvency crises,
we need to consider their positive effect on the incentives to borrow  to take advantage of better terms.
The effects of a perfect international rescue package can be studied in the unified framework of conditions (5), (6),
and (7) as follows.  Consider the default condition ?(s[D]+g[D] +?)=C[D], where insolvency risk is P+?.  The market
benchmark case developed in the previous section obtains for ?=-p(k-1)<0.  A perfect rescue package guarantees full
payment in the event of liquidity crises, and can therefore be seen as, ceteris paribus, reducing the crisis threshold s[D] by
setting ?=0, in which the case default occurs only in the insolvency intervals s<C[D]/? - g[D].  The generalized default
condition that obtains is:
(2)
The zero-profit condition (6) remains unchanged because s[D] refers in all cases to private default risk, in this case
after the package is applied.  Since in the case of a perfect package there is no bailout cost, the objective function (5) is also
unchanged.  Therefore the generalized optimal borrowing problem amounts to maximizing the same objective functions (5),
given conditions (6) and (8).  The problem retains the same general characteristics (see appendix) and, therefore, optimal
borrowing is obtained by the same first-order condition, where the parameter ? is now emphasized:
(2)
The availability of (rationally anticipated) packages increases country creditworthiness and, therefore, would lead
to correspondingly lower risk premia for any given borrowing amount, which reduces insolvency risk.  However, as shown
in the appendix, optimal private borrowing D* also increases with the rescue program as a reaction to these better terms,
which increases insolvency risk.  Therefore, the question of the net result of the package program on insolvency risk is in
principle ambiguous.
Under the simplifying linear assumption that g@=0, optimal borrowing implies that the introduction of a perfect
rescue program does not alter the probability of insolvency prevailing in the market benchmark case (see appendix). 
Therefore, a perfect package reduces the probability of crisis by p(k-1), that is, the probability of liquidity crisis, leaving the
probability of solvency crisis unchanged.  In this model, the effects of more affordable terms and increased borrowing exactly
cancel each other. This result assumes that the official rescue package is not tied to conditionality:  Effective conditionality
would alter the constraints in the country=s maximization problem and could lead to lower borrowing and insolvency risk.
 However, such conditionality would not be credible, and therefore effective, because the incentives to enforce it are not time-
C[D] = ) + g[D] + (s[D] r l
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consistent.  The failure to meet the conditions would call for the nonapplication of rescue packages in the event of liquidity
crises, while it is ex-post optimal to apply them.
19  The result remains that rescue packages are ineffective for dealing with
solvency crises.
                                               
19  Furthermore, it is not clear in the context of this model why such conditionality would be beneficial ex-ante. 
The modest achievements of even a perfect rescue package should be interpreted as a warning, since its
implementation is not feasible in reality.  The rule of applying official rescue packages if and only if the crisis is one of
liquidity implies a solvency assessment riddled with verifiability and commitment problems, let alone purely technical
difficulties.  The application of such a rule is subject to significant errors, which justifies the study of imperfect packages.
 The most interesting and realistic case is one where rescue packages are (unintendedly) applied to solvency crises with
probability q > 0.  This over-application in solvency crises is accompanied by under-application in liquidity crises unless
liquidity crises are perfectly detected.  In particular, if liquidity crises cannot be distinguished from solvency crises, rescue
packages are applied to all crises, liquidity and solvency, with probability q.
The default condition (8) is also applicable to these imperfect packages, where ?=-p (k-1) corresponds to the case
in which liquidity and solvency crises are not distinguished (as in the market solution) and where ?=0 corresponds to the
case of perfect detection of liquidity crises (as in perfect packages).  However, the zero-profit condition changes to reflect
that with imperfect packages there is a range of crises in which private creditors are fully compensated with probability q.
 This range includes solvency crises, where the compensation amounts to a bailout, and liquidity crises when they are
imperfectly detected.  If the bailout resources are unlimited, so is the fraction q to be captured in default, in which case
private creditors would supply unlimited capital at ever-increasing zero-profit premia, forcing default and collecting the
expected bailout.  We will discard this kind of opportunistic equilibrium by implicitly assuming that it is credible to refuse
to extend rescue packages in those abusive situations.
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(1)
The bailout amounts to the additional payment that bondholders receive in the insolvency states s < s[D] + ?.  The
bailout is the difference between full payment C[D] and default payment ?(s+g[D]-(k-1)).  The cost of the bailout (B) is
minimized when optimal liquidity Fmax = 0 is provided.  Given that  P + ? = s[D] + ? -m, the probability of overall insolvency
risk, of which only a fraction (1-q) is private under this imperfect package, the integral yields a bailout cost (see appendix)
of:
   (1)
The country=s welfare function changes in the case of imperfect packages because of the official financial
 loss B involved in the bailout, which, ex-ante, accrues to the country.  Furthermore, now the efficiency loss due to the
liquidity crunch is realized only a fraction (1-q) of the times a crisis state occurs.  Pulling together the various pieces, the
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C  Imperfect Rescue Package (Liquidity crisis detected): ? = 0 and q > 0
C  Imperfect Rescue Package (Liquidity crisis not detected): ? = -p (k-1) and q > 0.
The analysis of imperfect packages builds on the previous analyses by considering the effect of variations in the
parameter q.  It is shown in the appendix that the element of bailout in rescue packages introduces moral hazard that leads
to overborrowing.  As a result, private default risk (1-q)P[?,q], that is, the portion of risk absorbed by private creditors,
increases with q under both scenarios of liquidity crisis detection.  It is shown in the appendix that the implicit partial
guarantee given by the rescue program leads to the country engaging in riskier borrowing regardless of whether or not
liquidity crises are successfully detected:
(1)
The previous result assumes no conditionality attached to the rescue program.  In theory, the conditions associated
with the program could lead to less demand for borrowing and, consequently, lower default risk.  However, this conditionality
would be credible only if its enforcement is time consistent, i.e., it is optimal for the official sector to follow the rules ex-post,
once the crisis emerges.  It is clear that the emergency nature of crisis situations makes the implementation of future
conditions impossible and restricts conditionality to preconditions.   If the imperfections in the implementation of the package
are small (liquidity crises are detected and the error parameter q is small), then the package would be almost always applied
to liquidity crises, which is ex-post optimal, and preconditions indicating the contrary are not credible.  If the imperfections
in the implementation of the package are large (e.g., liquidity and solvency crises are not distinguished), then, given this large
degree of ignorance,  it is likely that the degree of compliance with the preconditions will add little information to the
assessment of the probability that a given crisis is of solvency or liquidity.  In this case, any rescue program perceived as
beneficial will remain so even if conditions are not met, that is, the ex-post probability of failure p will not be substantially
reassessed,  and  packages will be applied ex-post in all cases, thus rendering the conditionality ineffective.  Credibility
severely limits the application of conditionality to rescue programs and suggests that the assumption in the paper is a good
approximation under a broad range of circumstances.
20
                                               
20  Additional arguments justifying the assumption of no conditionality can be found in Rodrik (1989).
  Riskier lending in (16) implies that the probability of insolvency, P[?,q]+?, also keeps increasing with q. 
Therefore, insolvency risk is larger than under a perfect package or under the market benchmark.  Riskier lending also
implies that the probability of default, or crisis risk, also increases with q.  This crisis risk is equal to P[?,q]+q?, the sum
of the insolvency risk, P+?, and the probability of liquidity crises left undetected, -?(1-q).  As long as there is insolvency risk
(P>-?), equation (15) implies that crisis risk increases for any positive q.  The resulting crisis risk is depicted in Figure 1
under two scenarios: 1) liquidity and solvency crises are not distinguished (?=-p(k-1)), so that at q=0 the market benchmark
crisis risk P*=P[-p(k-1),0] obtains; and 2) perfect detection of liquidity crises (?=0), so that at q=0 the perfect package crisis
risk P[0,0] obtains.  As shown above, under the simplifying linear assumption g@=0, a  perfect package reduces crisis risk
by the probability of liquidity crises: P*-P[0,0]=p(k-1).
(Insert Figure 1 here)
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If liquidity and solvency crises are not distinguished (upper curve in figure 1), rescue programs of any size are
counterproductive.  As long as the rule used to decide whether or not to provide financial rescue with frequency q does not
discriminate between liquidity and solvency crises, what can be interpreted as an arbitrary mixed strategy, rescue programs
lead to a higher risk of crisis.  The market alone, without any program, would lead to less default.  Even if liquidity crises
are perfectly detected (lower curve in figure 1), rescue packages can also be counterproductive.  Since the risk of liquidity
crises p(k-1) may be small or null, either because of weak liquidity effects (k=1) or because investors never panic and the
bad equilibrium is never selected (p=0), the negative effect of  moral hazard (the increasing slope of the curve) may quickly
dominate the benefit of the elimination of liquidity crises (the discrete gain at the origin estimated at p(k-1)) and lead to the
overall heightening of the risk of financial crises.
As the implicit guarantee rate q increases, moral hazard is more intense.  It is clear that if the rescue package is
applied in all crises, that is, q = 1, there is full insurance against default, private creditors face no risk, debt jumps to the
credit ceiling induced by the implicit bailout limit, and the probability of (official) default increases to one.  However, a full
guarantee is not needed for certain  insolvency: a moderately imperfect package can lead to the same collapse.  It is shown
in the appendix that  there is a lower value for the error q, q* < 1, at which insolvency always obtains (P=1).
6.   CONCLUDING REMARKS
All financial crises are necessarily associated with rational doubts about solvency; i.e., about  the country=s
willingness to sacrifice to avoid default.  Based on that rationality constraint, in this paper we have built a crisis typology
that distinguishes between crises that can be avoided by adequate debt rescheduling (liquidity crises) and those that cannot
(solvency crises).  Liquidity crises occur if and only if there are multiple equilibria (and the crisis equilibrium is selected).
 Liquidity crises can be interpreted as panic driven and insolvency crises as fundamentals driven.
Liquidity crises are not possible unless the following three conditions hold.  First, lack of liquidity has a strong
negative effect on solvency; weak liquidity effects do not generate liquidity  crises.  Second, solvency is relatively weak; a
liquidity crisis reflects a near-insolvency situation.  And third, investors are prone to panic, in the sense that with significant
probability they may fail to coordinate beliefs around fundamentals when sunspot equilibria exist. 
The distinction between liquidity and solvency crises is useful not only conceptually but also operationally.  In
particular, the performance of official financial rescue packages crucially depends on this distinction.   When applied to
liquidity crises, rescue packages are cost free and completely effective in diffusing (or preventing) them.   When applied to
solvency crises, rescue packages result in a costly bailout of private creditors that only postpones default.
The rational anticipation of the possible application of rescue packages in the context of an established program
improves perceived country creditworthiness and, therefore, lowers risk premia.  On the one hand, this effect leads to more
affordable contractual obligations, which reduces the risk of default.  On the other hand, this effect also leads to higher
borrowing, which increases the risk of default.  The net effect of a rescue program depends on the relative importance of
each.
It is likely that the implementation of an official rescue program will result in official financial losses and may easily
turn counterproductive regarding risk of default.  The supporting reasons are:
1. The benefits of a perfect rescue program (i.e., rescue packages are applied if and only if there is liquidity crisis)
are limited by two main factors.  First, the direct benefits on solvency of avoiding liquidity crises  are null or small
unless liquidity effects on solvency are very strong and investors are highly prone to panic.  Second, the indirect
benefits on insolvency risk through the improvement in country creditworthiness are null because the positive
impact on more affordable terms is fully offset by higher borrowing.
2. Perfect packages are not feasible.  Theoretical speculation, as well debate about  the Mexican evidence, strongly
suggest that rescue packages are substantially imperfect (i.e., they are applied  to solvency crises with some sizable
probability).  While perfect packages
certainly cause no harm, the costs of imperfect implementation may easily outweigh their  small benefits.
3. Imperfect rescue packages are onerous.  They lead to official financial losses in the form of costly bailouts of private
creditors. 
4. Imperfect rescue programs may fail in delivering a reduction in the risk of crisis and may  easily turn
counterproductive.  They encourage risky borrowing because their application in solvency crises is equivalent to
an implicit unpaid partial guarantee, which introduces moral hazard into the optimal borrowing decision.  As a
result, the insolvency risk is larger than it would be with no rescue program at all, and increases with the degree25
of imperfection.  If liquidity and solvency crises are not distinguished, any rescue program is counterproductive
regarding the overall risk of default.  Even if liquidity crises are detected, as the degree of imperfection increases
the direct benefits on liquidity crises are progressively offset, first eliminating any reduction in default risk and then
turning counterproductive.   
Financial rescue programs designed on the basis of the emergency package provided to Mexico appear to be
unsatisfactory as  international mechanisms for dealing with external financial crises, and alternative approaches are needed.
 In the transition, it is important to eliminate the expectation that rescue programs will be applied in the case of payment
crises, because otherwise overborrowing will continue to be fueled.  This overborrowing not only deepens the fundamental
problem of crisis risk but also complicates the credibility of the commitment not to use rescue packages, since they may be
more attractive ex-post once part of their moral hazard cost is sunk.26
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Appendix
Section 4
Differentiating (6) and (7) with respect to D yields:
(A1)
(A2)
Substituting (A2) into (A1):
(A3)
where Q = P + (1 - p) (k - 1)
When P=0, lending is riskless and C[D] = D.  For risky lending (P > 0), (A3) is applicable. Since Q  > 0 and ? g= < 1, C=
> 1 (risk premium).  The credit ceiling obtains at Q = 1 (P = 1- (1 - p) (k -1)), where C== + 4.
Differentiating (A3) and (A2):
(A4)
   (A5)
Since c= > ?g=, s=> 0, and g@ < 0, then from (A4) C@> 0 (increasing risk premium).  Then from (A5),  s@ > 0.
Then the FOC  U== g=-ks== 0 determines the unique maximum given that under the assumptions U=> 0 at P = 0 (s= < g=/k)




Similar results are established following the same steps as in section 4.   Now the functions s and C are s[?, D] and C[?, D]1
with -p (k-1) <  ? < 0.   In particular,
1 = 1) - )(k - (1   s - C P) - (1 + g P p l l ¢ ¢ ¢
C = ) g + s ( ¢ ¢ ¢ l
1 = C   Q) - (1 + g Q ¢ ¢ l
0 = ) g - c ( s Q)C"- - g"+(1 Q ¢ ¢ ¢ l l
C" = ) (s"+g" l
1 = ) + 1 - (k s - c P) - (1 + g P 2 2 r l l ¢28
(A6)
(A7)
where Q = P + ? + k - 1.
Second order conditions are unchanged.
Now the credit ceiling is reached at P = 2 - k - ?.
The FOC is now: g=[D*] = ks2[?, D*], which defines an implicit function D* [?] characterized by:
   
  (A8)
where the denominator is
negative (SOC) and s12 can
also be shown to be negative by computing the corresponding differentiations:
Differentiating with respect to ?:
(A9)
       (A10)
Substituting,  -s1 (1 - Q) = 1 - P, and therefore 1 + s1 = (1-k-?) / (1 - Q) < 0.
Differentiating again:
(A11)
which implies that s12 < 0.
If g@= 0, g= is constant and the FOC implies that s2 [?, D* [?]]  is constant for all ?.  From (A6), this implies that c2 constant.
  Then from (A7), Q is constant, and therefore
      (A12)
Therefore the probability of insolvency, P + ?, is constant.
Imperfect Package
Using the default condition, the cost of the bailout is:
1 = c Q) - (1 + g Q 2 ¢ l
0 > ) ks (g"-   /   ) ks ( = /d * dD 22 12 r
0 = ) + 1 - (k   s - c   P) - (1 1 1 r l
c = 1) + s ( 1 1 l
) s + (1   s = Q) - (1   s 1 2 12
constant   + 1) - (k + P r29
(A13)
For  small q, the problem is concave by continuity.
Differentiating the zero-profit condition (14) and using the default condition (15):
(A14)
Substituting C= =  ? s
= + ? g
=:
(A15)
The FOC is U= = g= -s= ((1-q)k + q?(m-?)) + q?ss== 0.  Substituting P = s-m:
(A16)
If g@ = 0, eliminating s= from (A15) and (A16) yields an implicit function P[q]:
(A17)
Under the assumption that ? g= > k / (1 + k) , k* > k
Implicit differentiation of (A17) leads to dP/dq.  It is easy to check that dP
2/dPd?>0.  Private insolvency risk:
(A18)
Therefore private insolvency risk, and insolvency risk in general, increases with q for
 where the denominator is positive.
The extreme case of P = 1 is obtained in (A17) as:




r l r l
r
￿
1 = g P q) - (1 + P)) - (1 + (qP C + 1)) - (k q) - (-(1 s ¢ ¢ ¢ l l
g - 1 = P))) - (1 + (qP + 1) - (k q) - (-(1 s ¢ ¢ l l l
g = )) + (P q - q)k - ((1 s ¢ ¢ r l
* k = ) g - /(1 g = P))) - (1 + (qP + 1) - q)(k - ))/(-(1 + (P q - q)k - ((1 ¢ ¢ l l r l
=   P - q)dP/dq - (1 = q)P)/dq - d((1





Since k < 2, it is easy
to check that q* < k* /
(? + k*).
This limit q* is an upper bound.  Borrowing and risk may increase even more steeply if the FOC fails to be a global
maximum. Therefore insolvency risk monotonically increases with q until it reaches sure insolvency at q* < 1.
)) + (1 + k*) + k*)/(k(1 - k*) + (k(1 = q* r l31
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